The invasion was the result of a long-standing territorial dispute. Iraq accused Kuwait of violating the Iraqi border to secure oil resources, (on July 17, 1990 Saddam Hussein accused Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates of flooding the world oil market. In addition, he singled out Kuwait for the production of oil from a disputed supply, the Rumaila oil field), and demanded that its debt repayments should be waived. (7:1)
Direct negotiations were begun in July 1990, but they were destined soon to fail; along with reassurance from the United States making a claim that they would not get involved (the famous meeting of Saddam Hussein with April Glaspie, the United States Ambassador to Iraq, on the 25th of July, 1990). This was the go ahead that Hussein needed. (8:1) Arab mediators convinced Iraq and Kuwait to negotiate their differences in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, on August 1, 1990, but that session resulted only in charges and countercharges. A second session was scheduled to take place in Baghdad, the Iraqi capital, but Iraq invaded Kuwait the next day.
(9:1) Iraqi troops overran the country shortly after midnight on 2nd August 1990. The U. S. fell short on its claim to not get involved and instantly declared interest in keeping Saudi Arabia safe. (10:1) The History of Operation Desert Strom: On the morning of August 2, 1990 the mechanized infantry, armor, and tank units of the Iraqi Republican Guard invaded Kuwait and seized control of that country. The invasion triggered a United States response, Operation DESERT SHIELD, to deter any invasion of Kuwaits oil rich neighbor, Saudi Arabia. On August 7, deployment of U. S. forces began.
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 660 and 662 condemned Iraqs invasion and annexation and called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces. On August 20 President Bush signed National Security Directive 45, U. S. Policy in Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, outlining U. S. objectives which included the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait, and the restoration of Kuwaits legitimate government to replace the puppet regime installed by Iraq. (2) A U. N.
ultimatum, Security Council Resolution 678, followed on November 29, 1990. It stipulated that if Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein did not remove his troops from Kuwait by January 15, 1991 a U. S. -led coalition was authorized to drive them out. Early in the morning of January 17, Baghdad time, the U. S. -led coalition launched air attacks against Iraqi targets. On February 24, coalition ground forces begin their attack. On February 27, Kuwait City was declared liberated, and with allied forces having driven well into Iraq, President Bush and his advisers decided to halt the war.
A cease-fire took effect at 8:00 the following morning. (3) A crucial element of the Persian Gulf war was the Iraqi launch of its modified Scud missiles. Iraq originally obtained Scud missiles, along with much of the rest of its military equipment, from their producerthe Soviet Union. This 1970s study provides basic data on various aspects of the Scud Bincluding, among others, its range, payload, warhead type, and accuracy. It also provides information on the background of the missile and conclusions based on U. S. materiel exploitation of one or more Scuds. (4)
On December 2, 1990, six weeks before the United States and its allies initiated Operation Desert Storm, Iraq test launched three Scud missiles from sites in eastern Iraq, which impacted in western Iraq. This DIA report, based at least in part on data from Defense Support Program launch detection satellites, provides first notification of the launch and basic data on the nature of the missilesincluding type, launch sites and impact areasas well as other relevant information.
It was reported that the Iraqi test firing allowed the U. S. to fine-tune its launch detection system, which proved of great value during Desert Storm. (5) During the Persian Gulf War Iraq fired 88 Iraqi-modified Scuds at Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. The Scud attacks on Israel threatened to provoke Israel into a counterattack, which the U. S. wished to avoid for fear that it would shatter the Allied coalition.
From the beginning of the war destruction of Iraqi Scuds represented a high priority for U. S. and allied forceswhich involved the use of space systems, aerial platforms, and special operations forces. Destruction of Iraqs mobile Scud forces proved far more difficult than expected, in part due to Iraqi tactics. At wars end there had been no confirmed kills of mobile Scuds. This post-war DIA assessment focuses on a number of subjects, including pre-war intelligence assumptions, Iraqi Scud deployment and dispersal, the capabilities of Iraqs extended range Scuds, and means of measuring the effectiveness of the counter-Scud effort.
It concluded that the lessons learned during Operation DESERT STORM can provide the framework for developing a more effective, realistic approach to targeting both Third World ballistic missiles and Soviet mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles in the future. (6) A key element in allied success in the Persian Gulf War was the U. S. -British led air campaign prior to the commencement of the ground campaign. That air campaign marked the first major use of the F-117A, Nighthawk, stealth fighter, the existence of which was declassified in 1988 shortly before its first combat in Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama in 1989.
This chronology, in addition to covering events related to F-117A deployment and operations, provides a day-by-day, wave-by-wave, account of operations against Iraqi targets. It provides specifics on targets, bombs dropped, and the 37th Fighter Wings general assessment of the effectiveness of the attacks. Subsequent studies of F-117A operations, such as that of the General Accounting Office, were more skeptical of the F-117A effectiveness. (7) What is the situation now in the context of 1990 war?